Inheritance Unbound: The Politics of Personal Law Reform in Pakistan and India by Nelson, Matthew J.
chapter seven
Inheritance Unbound 





This essay addresses the constitutional and political dimensions of formal legal change in Pakistan and India. The changes I address 
here have one chief characteristic. Above all, they involve a process 
of change with an explicitly ‘religious’ dimension: in effect, a process 
of changing ostensibly ‘transcendent’ or ‘God-given’ personal laws.
What are the constitutional and political conditions under which 
the content of such laws is made to change in Pakistan and India? 
What are the constitutional and political conditions that might 
intervene to stifle or restrict such change? Is it possible for ordinary 
legislators, in either country, to stand up and say, on any given day: 
‘Behold! Today the Laws of God have changed. Today we will write 
a new religious law?’ This is, briefly stated, the question I address in 
the context of this essay.
I am particularly interested in the ways in which Pakistan’s status 
as an ‘Islamic’ State (in effect, a State with a special constitutional 
commitment to the terms of Islamic law) might affect the process 
of religious-cum-legal change. Does the ‘Islamic’ status of Pakistan’s 
Constitution constrain the process of (formal) legal change—with 
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specific reference to the substance of ostensibly ‘religious’ personal 
laws—in any way?
Those with an interest in such questions often view the 
substantive terms of Islamic law, and especially State-based 
Islamic laws associated with specific types of formal constitutional 
protection, as somehow unusually ‘inflexible’ or ‘fixed’ (both for 
reasons of ‘sacredness’ and for specific ‘constitutional’ reasons). 
In the context of this essay, however, I take a closer look at this 
perspective, focusing specifically on the dynamics of religious-
cum-political debate, religious-cum-legal flexibility, and ultimately, 
formal (and substantive) legal change.
Of course, neither Pakistan nor India is, as it were, constitutionally 
‘French’, requiring a strict exclusion of religion from the legal affairs 
of the State. Neither is constitutionally ‘American’, requiring either 
a Jeffersonian wall of separation between religion, religious law, 
and the State (absent in India), or a firm commitment to religious 
non-establishment (absent in Pakistan). Both seek to engage and, 
in some sense, actively incorporate (within the State itself ) the 
specific terms of ‘religious’ personal law. Both have courts with the 
power to interpret and enforce ostensibly ‘God-given’ laws. In fact, 
the difference between them simply lies in the fact that, over time, 
Pakistan has incorporated an explicit commitment to move beyond 
the ‘equal status’ approach adopted by India (according to which, by 
law, each religious tradition is supposed to be treated equally within 
a framework tied to specific notions of ‘public order’ and ‘morality’) 
in favour of what might be described as a ‘special status’ approach 
(according to which the State is constitutionally obliged to privilege 
the specific injunctions of Islam).1 
Key similarities and important differences notwithstanding, I 
will pose the same set of questions for both Pakistan and India: Is 
it possible for the Pakistani legislature, facing explicit ‘special status’ 
conditions, to stand up and say on any given day, ‘Behold!’? Is it 
possible for the Indian legislature, facing its own very different set 
of conditions, to stand up and say, ‘Rejoice! Today the Laws of God 
have changed!’?
1 See in this volume, Chapter 8 (John H. Mansfield, ‘Religious Freedom in India 
and Pakistan: The Matter of Conversion’).
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The answer to this question is interesting. It is interesting, because, 
notwithstanding several important differences in each country, the 
answer seemed to remain more or less exactly the same in both 
countries for nearly sixty years (1947–2005). In fact, at a basic 
constitutional level, both countries articulated a pattern in which the 
postcolonial legislature was empowered to stand up and say, ‘Behold!’. 
There was, in other words, no clearly enforceable constitutional 
proscription on such a proclamation in either country—a condition 
that remains in place even today.
At a specifically political level, however, both countries seemed 
to articulate a pattern in which this rather permissive constitutional 
position—by all accounts a position allowing almost unlimited space 
for reinterpretive religious-cum-legal reform—was taken up and put 
into practice only under very limited circumstances. In fact, the basic 
punchline of this essay lies in drawing attention to a political pattern 
in which this process of substantive religious-cum-legal reform was 
limited (in practice) to just two very specific contexts: first, a political 
context defined by military and/or non-military authoritarianism 
(for example, the military dictatorship of General Mohammad Ayub 
Khan in Pakistan or the Emergency led by Indira Gandhi in India); 
and, second, a political context defined by one-party dominant 
regimes in which the ruling party held, on its own, more than 60 per 
cent of the existing seats in the legislature.
Substantive religious-cum-legal reform, in other words, is 
constitutionally permitted in both countries. The terms of religious 
personal law are not (constitutionally) ‘immutable’. (As John 
Mansfield notes in Chapter 8 of this volume, States have had an 
important role to play when it comes to the definition of personal 
religious practice in both countries.) And, yet, having said this, the 
political conditions under which each State has pushed for reform 
are revealing. Change has occurred, almost exclusively, in a political 
climate defined by a certain ‘immunity’ from the terms of multi-
party (or cross-party) bargaining. Indeed, only unrivalled political 
elites have tended to be, legislatively, in a position to stand up and 
‘speak for God’.
Throughout, my focus is confined to just one area of religious-
cum-legal reform: inheritance. In fact, the thrust of most debates 
regarding the general topic of inheritance, both in Pakistan and 
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in India, has typically involved a specific set of concerns regarding 
the extent to which ordinary legislators might be in a position to 
‘add’ new heirs to what many regarded as an already ‘existing’ and 
ostensibly ‘sacred’ list. 
In India, among Hindus, married women tend to be excluded 
from the list of heirs outlined in the sacred Hindu shastras. And, as a 
result, political actors have frequently disagreed about the extent to 
which women might be ‘added’ to that ‘existing’ list of heirs—not 
simply as a matter of local practice or custom but rather as a matter 
of substantive and enforceable law.
The debate has, however, been more nuanced among Muslims in 
Pakistan, because within the Holy Qur’an women are already included 
in the list of so-called ‘Qur’anic’ heirs.2 (They actually dominate that 
list.3) Notwithstanding efforts to enforce that list (against enduring 
notions of agnatic or all-male ‘tribal custom’), therefore, the question 
of reform has largely moved beyond the question of adding individual 
women in favour of a more specific set of questions regarding the 
possibility of ‘adding’ orphaned grandchildren. In Qur’anic terms, 
many scholars insist that these grandchildren are excluded from the 
process of inheritance within their families by the ‘early’ death of 
their parents. And, yet, some reformers have attempted to ‘correct’ 
this anomaly even within the suras (verses) of the Holy Qur’an.4 
In fact, in some cases, they have taken it upon themselves to ‘add’ 
orphaned grandchildren to the list of sacred heirs by law.5
2 See, Lucy Carroll, ‘The Hanafi Law of Intestate Succession: A Simplified 
Approach’, Modern Asian Studies, (1983), 17(4): 629–70; and ‘The Ithna Ashari 
Law of Intestate Succession: An Introduction to Shia Law Applicable in South Asia’, 
Modern Asian Studies, (1985), 19(1): 85–124. 
3 See, for example, verses 4:11, 4:12, and 4:176. Marmaduke Pickthall, The 
Meaning of the Glorious Qur’an (Taj Company Ltd.: Karachi, 1971), pp. 74, 75, 98.
4 For a discussion of the Qur’an, later commentaries on the subject of Islamic 
inheritance, and the relationship between these commentaries and later effort to 
‘correct’ the status of orphaned grandchildren, see, N.J. Coulson, Succession in the 
Muslim Family (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1971). 
5 See, N.J. Coulson, ‘Islamic Family Law: Progress in Pakistan’, in J.N.D. Anderson 
(ed.), Changing Law in Developing Countries (George Allen & Unwin: London, 
1963), pp. 240–57; J.N.D. Anderson, ‘Recent Reforms in the Islamic Law of 
Inheritance’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, (1965), Issue 14: 349–65; 
Lucy Carroll, ‘Succession of Orphaned Grandchildren in Pakistan: Conflicting 
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The question concerns the extent to which these legislative 
reformers, both in Pakistan and in India, might be in a position, both 
constitutionally and politically, to advance the reforms they desire.6 
In fact, the question concerns the circumstances within which 
ordinary legislators have actually found themselves in a position to 
stand up and say, ‘Behold! Henceforth daughters shall be treated as 
equal members of every Hindu coparcenary’. Or, ‘Hark! Orphaned 
grandchildren will henceforth be entitled to a specific share of every 
ancestral estate’. 
the PolItIcs of Personal law reform In PakIstan
Within the Islamic Republic of Pakistan one might expect the 
institutionalization of Islamic injunctions (within the Constitution) to 
introduce specific constraints on postcolonial patterns of independent 
legislative action. A special clause known as the Objectives Resolution 
(adopted in 1949 and added to the Constitution as a general 
preamble in 1956, before being elevated to the status of a substantive 
article—Article 2A— in 1985), for instance, states that ‘the Muslims 
of Pakistan shall be enabled to order their lives in accordance with 
the fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam’. In fact, 
further language embedded within the so-called directive principles 
goes on to note that specific steps, beginning with the establishment 
of a special institution known as the Council of Islamic Ideology, 
will be taken to ensure that (a) every law in Pakistan is brought into 
Judgments on the Method of Calculation’, Islamic and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
(1984), 4: 247–50; and, finally, Lucy Carroll, ‘Orphaned Grandchildren in Islamic 
Law of Succession: Reform and Islamization in Pakistan’, Islamic Law and Society, 
(1998), 5(3): 420–36.
6 Before the promulgation of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (MFLO) in 
1961, colonial and postcolonial efforts to engage Islamic laws of inheritance within 
the territories that formed a part of Pakistan did not address the task of ‘substantive’ 
reform. More often than not they simply took the question of substance for granted 
and sought to extend or restrict its application. See for example, the West Punjab 
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948, the Northwest Frontier 
Province Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1950, the Punjab Muslim 
Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Amendment) Act, 1951, and so on. See also, 
with reference to India as a whole, the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application 
Act, 1937.
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conformity with ‘the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy 
Quran and Sunnah’ and, moreover, that (b) ‘no law [will] be…
enacted which is repugnant to such injunctions’.
Having established this Council of Islamic Ideology, however, 
the Constitution goes on to limit its role quite severely, noting 
in Article  230, for instance, that the work of this Council will 
be confined to providing ‘advice’ and ‘recommendations’ to the 
President, the National Assembly, the Provincial Assemblies, and so 
on. In fact, when General Ayub Khan intervened to ‘add’ orphaned 
grandchildren to the list of existing Qur’anic heirs in 1961, building 
directly on the work of a special Commission on Marriage and Family 
Laws with the promulgation of a bold new ordinance known as the 
Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (MFLO), the Council of Islamic 
Ideology was powerless to stop him.7 Indeed, the Constitution did 
not constrain the process of reform. It merely provided a framework 
for ongoing (reform-oriented) advice.8
7 In its push for reform, the Commission explained that ‘if a person leaves a 
great deal of property and his father pre-deceased him, the grandfather gets the 
share that the father of the deceased would have got’, adding that, [if ] the right of 
representation is recognised by Muslim law among the ascendants,…it does not…
seem logical…that the right of representation should not be recognised among the 
lineal descendants as well (emphasis added). Quoted in Lucy Carroll, ‘The Pakistan 
Federal Shariat Court, Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, and the 
Orphaned Grandchild’, Islamic Law and Society, (2002), 9(1): 72 (fn7). ‘The Islamic 
law of inheritance’, they argued, ‘cannot be irrational and inequitable’. Quoted in 
Carroll, ‘Orphaned Grandchildren’, (1998), p. 409 (fn1). Carroll, however, finds 
this analogy to the right of representation among ascendants ‘unconvincing’, 
because, she notes, ‘the father’s father takes in the absence of the father, not because 
he represents the father, but because in the absence of the father he is the nearest male 
agnatic ascendant’, p. 411 (fn10). For further criticism, see, A.B.M. Sultanul Alam 
Chowdhury, ‘The Problem of Representation in the Muslim Law of Inheritance’, 
Islamic Studies, (1964), 3: 375–91.
8 According to N.J. Coulson, the ‘arbitrary and specious reasoning’ of the 
Commission on Marriage and Family Laws ‘demonstrated only the most superficial 
familiarity with Islamic legal history’. In fact, he argues, ‘it is not surprising…
that their proposals were condemned by their traditionalist colleague [Maulana 
Ehtisham-ul-Haq Thanvi] as an unwarranted interference by laymen in the realm 
of sacred law’. See ‘Islamic Family Law’, p. 247. Lucy Carroll adds that ‘the claim 
on the part of a seven-member Commission containing three female members 
and only one representative of the ulema of a right to exercise ijtehad [that is, 
independent religious-cum-legal reasoning] and the promulgation of many of 
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In 1973, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto promulgated an 
entirely new Constitution. But even then, the reforms introduced 
by General Ayub Khan remained firmly in place. The Constitution 
itself stated that Islam would be ‘the State religion’ (Article 2); but 
having said this, Bhutto ensured that the MFLO (1961) was carefully 
protected by a special constitutional provision known as the First 
Schedule.9 In fact, he incorporated this First Schedule as a special 
ring-fence provision specifically to ensure that the MFLO would be 
shielded from any threat of malign judicial review—for example, on 
the grounds that its reform-oriented provisions regarding orphaned 
grandchildren were incompatible with ‘a fundamental right’ to some 
(countervailing) form of ‘religious expression’. The constitutional 
status of Islam, in other words, was rendered explicit. But, even then, 
its reach did not extend to any repeal of existing religious-cum-legal 
‘reforms’.
General Zia-ul-Haq, for his part, launched his well-known 
‘Islamization’ campaign with the construction of a parallel religious 
judiciary—first in conjunction with four so-called ‘shariat benches’ 
attached to each provincial High Court (1979) and then in conjunction 
with a new-fangled Federal Shariat Court (FSC) in Islamabad 
(1980).10 Moving beyond the purely ‘advisory’ role of the Council of 
Islamic Ideology, these new courts, including the Shariat Appellate 
Bench of the Pakistan Supreme Court, were empowered to decide 
whether or not existing laws were in fact ‘repugnant to the injunctions 
of Islam’ and, if they were, to render them ineffective. But having 
[their] recommendations as law by a martial law administration possessing neither 
Islamic nor democratic credentials…did not commend themselves to all sections 
of society. The ulema were particularly and predictably outspoken in their dissent’. 
Caroll, ‘Orphaned Grandchildren’, p. 436. See also, Tanzil-ur-Rahman, ‘Succession 
Under Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961’, Pakistan Law Digest, (1982), pp. 
99–113. 
 9 The First Schedule of the 1973 Constitution listed every law protected from the 
terms of Article 8, which stated that laws found to be inconsistent with fundamental 
rights protections would be considered legally ‘null and void’. (In fact, by adding 
the MFLO and some 50–60 other laws to this Schedule, the Constitution freed the 
MFLO from any challenge on the basis of allegations regarding specific fundamental 
rights violations—for example, the right to profess or practise one’s own religion.)
10 See, Presidential Order No. 3 of 1979 (7 February 1979) and Presidential 
Order No. 1 of 1980 (27 May 1980). 
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established this parallel judiciary, Zia (somewhat surprisingly) went 
on to limit its scope, once again restricting it to the review of any 
law except (a) the Constitution itself and (b) ‘Muslim personal law’. 
Indeed, by 1980, Jeffrey A. Redding argues that some had begun 
to ponder what might be described as the ‘limited limitations’ of 
Pakistan’s existing constitutional architecture, noting that ‘[a] crafty 
parliament (or military authority)’ should be able to legislate ‘free 
from [any] fear that the Federal Shariat Court might intervene’ simply 
by ‘including [the word] “Muslim”’ in the title of its legislation.11 
(After all, any law identified as a ‘Muslim personal law’ seemed to 
avoid any risk of judicial review.)
Even the Federal Shariat Court was slow in challenging this 
view. In the case of Farishta v. Federation of Pakistan (1980), for 
instance, the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court simply 
reiterated—with specific reference to inheritance—that the MFLO 
was, in fact, completely immune to any form of judicial review on the 
part of Pakistan’s shariat courts, adding, from a purely constitutional 
perspective, that Muslim personal laws were supposed to be reviewed 
by the (powerless) Council of Islamic Ideology.12
Even after the Preamble to the Constitution (a.k.a. the Objectives 
Resolution) was elevated from its position as a non-binding preamble 
to the status of a substantive Article 2A by virtue of an executive 
ordinance in 1985, the Supreme Court intervened in the case of 
Hakim Khan v. The State (1992) to declare that Article 2A was not a 
11 Jeffrey A. Redding, ‘Constitutionalizing Islam: Theory and Pakistan’, Virginia 
Journal of International Law, (2004), 44(759): 775. 
12 In Farishta, the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court dismissed a 
decision rendered by the Shariat Bench of the Peshawar High Court. Agreeing with 
the government—the government of Zia-ul-Haq—the Court declared that, as per 
Article 203(b), the MFLO was not subject to the scrutiny of the Federal Shariat 
Court. In particular, the Court noted that Article 203(b) was designed to ensure that 
the jurisdiction of the FSC was limited to the review of ‘ordinary’ legislation (applying 
to all citizens) rather than any ‘special’ legislation known as Muslim personal law 
(applying only to Muslims). This ‘Muslim-only’ legislation would continue to be 
referred to the Council of Islamic Ideology. See, Massamat Farishta v. Federation of 
Pakistan, Pakistan Law Digest, (1980), Peshawar 47 (Shariat). See also, Lucy Carroll, 
‘Nizam-e-Islam: Processes and Conflicts in Pakistan’s Programme of Islamisation, 
with Special Reference to the Position of Women’, Journal of Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics, (1982), 20: 57–95.
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‘supra-constitutional’ provision that could be used to invalidate other 
(ostensibly un-Islamic) parts of the Constitution itself (for example, 
the Constitution’s First Schedule).13 And in Kaneez Fatima v. Wali 
Mohammad (1993), the Court returned to the same issue, noting 
that  although Article 2A could be used to challenge the constitutional 
validity of an ‘executive ordinance’, it could not be used to strike 
down (a) other parts of the Constitution itself (following Hakim 
Khan) or, for that matter, (b) common pieces of routine legislation.14 
Indeed, following in the wake of Kaneez Fatima many came to believe 
that the courts were not in a position to import ‘the principles of 
Islam’ at all except to cater for special situations ‘untended by express 
legislation’.15 
Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, in other 
words, the Federal Shariat Courts took up several cases designed to 
clarify the limits of the ‘reformist’ domain. But legally speaking, few 
limits emerged. In fact, a closer reading suggests that it was not the 
legislature’s powers but its own that the Court was keen to check.
Finally, however, in the case of Dr Mahmood-ur-Rahman Faisal 
v. Government of Pakistan (1994), this pattern appeared to shift.16 
Stepping in to clarify the extent to which the terms of Muslim 
personal law were in fact ‘excluded’ from the possibility of review 
by the Federal Shariat Court, the Shariat Appellate Bench of the 
Pakistan Supreme Court explained that this ‘exclusion’ should not 
be taken to include the terms of Muslim personal law ‘as a whole’ 
(that is, Muslim personal law as it was said to apply to all Muslims 
in Pakistan). Instead, the Court declared, this exclusion was strictly 
limited to provisions that applied to a particular sect of Muslims. 
Only sectarian provisions, in other words, were ‘excluded’ from 
FSC-based patterns of religious-cum-legal ‘review’.17 (Of course, 
13 See, Hakim Khan v. The State, PLD, (1992) SC 585; see also, The State v. Zia-
ur-Rahman, PLD, (1973) SC 49.
14 See, Kaneez Fatima v. Wali Mohammad, PLD, (1993) SC 905.
15 Salman Akram Raja, ‘Islamisation of Laws in Pakistan’, South Asian Journal, 
(2003), 2.
16 See, Dr Mahmood-ur-Rahman Faisal v. Government of Pakistan, PLD, (1994) 
SC 507.
17 Article 227 (pertaining to the Council of Islamic Ideology) was later 
amended to ensure that, in evaluating existing and proposed laws for repugnancy 
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 Dr Mahmood-ur-Rahman Faisal did not intend to shield the MFLO 
from additional FSC-based scrutiny; but, with a few ‘sectarian’ 
adjustments, it could have done so very easily.18 After all, Islamic laws 
of inheritance are routinely applied in ‘sect-specific’ ways19).
 Precisely insofar as the MFLO was not seen as a ‘sect-specific’ 
law. However, it was in fact reviewed (as a law applying to ‘all of 
the Muslims in Pakistan’) in the famous case of Allah Rakha v. 
Pakistan (2000).20  This case was a landmark. In fact, the Federal 
Shariat Court hastened to reject the inheritance provisions of the 
MFLO (Section  4) outright, arguing that, from a purely religious 
perspective, the ancestral share provided to orphaned grandchildren 
was simply ‘un-Islamic’. Having said this, however, the Court did 
not go on to declare what the terms of Islamic law should be; instead 
it opted to leave this matter to the legislature, referring, by way of 
example, to the Egyptian Law of Bequests.21 Indeed, it explained that 
problems vis-à-vis the Qur’an and the Sunnah, the Council would define the 
terms ‘Qur’an’ and ‘Sunnah’ to mean ‘the Qur’an and Sunnah as interpreted 
by [each] sect’. See, Presidential Order No. 14 of 1980 (18 September 1980). 
(Even here, however, the work of the Council was limited to the provision of 
non-binding advice.) For an extension of this point, see also, Dr Amanat Ali v. 
Federation of Pakistan (1983).
18 ‘Considering that intra-sect mobilization is…easier than pan-Muslim 
mobilization’, notes Jeff Redding, ‘the legislation of sectarian or communitarian law 
could eventually become more common than other forms of “Islamic” legislation’. 
And, ‘if sectarian law proliferates’, he notes, ‘it is entirely possible the Shariat judicial 
system, as a result of its 1994 opinion, will encounter a future reduction in its 
jurisdiction….’ Redding, ‘Constitutionalizing Islam’, p. 785.
19 See, Lucy Carroll, ‘The Hanafi Law’; Ibid., ‘The Ithna Ashari Law’.
20 See, Allah Rakha v. The Federation of Pakistan, PLD, (2000) FSC 1.
21 In light of the fact that ‘certain shares had been fixed by the Qur’an and 
therefore could not be modified’, notes Fazlur Rahman, ‘Egypt felt unable to assign 
a share of direct inheritance to the orphaned grandchildren and had recourse to 
the principle of mandatory will’. This principle was related to an injunction 
(2:180) encouraging wills that many jurists treated as ‘abrogated’ by the subsequent 
introduction of fixed shares. But in Egypt—and after 2000, in Pakistan as well—
the ‘mandatory will’ appeared to be the preferred avenue of compromise between 
Qur’anic shares and contemporary notions of justice. Still, objections persisted. As 
Rahman explains, ‘the Egyptian law…prescribes an inheritance share which is only 
veiled as mandatory will, since (1) the law, even if the propositus has made no will, 
presumes a will nevertheless, and (2) for the purpose of [measuring]…the amount 
to be given to the orphaned grandchild the share of the dead father “if he were alive” 
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the government of Pakistan should not be so bold as to ‘add’ any 
new Qur’anic heirs, for example, by way of an ‘executive ordinance’; 
instead, the ruling party should simply be encouraged to follow in 
the footsteps of Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Kuwait, Jordan, Iraq, and 
many others, introducing an ordinary piece of legislation assuming 
the existence of a mandatory will to accomplish more or less exactly 
the same thing.22
Of course, many continued to insist that the terms of Muslim 
personal law were, somehow, fixed.23 But over time, the judicial 
record itself expressed a very different story. In fact, by the time the 
Court announced its famous Allah Rakha decision, the record was 
perfectly clear—a record of substantive religious-cum-legal reform 
promulgated by a military dictator, protected by an elected prime 
pinister, reinforced by a second military dictator, and then supported 
by a vast array of superior religious and constitutional courts. Clearly, 
the terms of religious-cum-legal ‘reform’ were not inconceivable. In 
fact, the terms of ‘reform’ were already very well entrenched.24
The conditions within which ‘reform’ was possible, however, were 
not determined (at least not exclusively) by the courts. More often 
is [still] kept as a necessary point of reference’. See, Fazlur Rahman, ‘A Survey of 
Modernization of Muslim Family Law’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 
(1980), 11(4): 464. Indeed, Lucy Carroll goes on to note that ‘it would be difficult 
to contend that [the ‘obligatory bequest’] is founded in the Qur’an and the Sunnah 
of the Prophet—as these have been traditionally interpreted for many centuries 
past’. Carroll, ‘Orphaned Grandchildren’, (1998), p. 445.
22 See, Egypt (1946), Syria (1953), Morocco (1958), Kuwait (1971), Jordan 
(1976), and Iraq (1979). Additional strategies of a similar sort—mostly pertaining 
to those who might wish to privilege certain heirs—were outlined by Lucy Carroll in 
her article, ‘Life Interests and the Inter-Generational Transfer of Property: Avoiding 
the Law of Succession’, Islamic Law and Society, (2001), 8(2): 245–86. 
23 See, Matthew J. Nelson, In the Shadow of Shari’ah: Islam, Islamic Law, and 
Democracy in Pakistan (Columbia University Press: New York, 2010).
24 For a comparative dimension, see, John R. Bowen, Islam, Law, and Equality 
in Indonesia: An Anthropology of Public Reasoning (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2003) and ‘Qur’an, Justice, Gender: Internal Debates in Indonesian 
Islamic Jurisprudence’, History of Religions, 38(1): 68–70, 72–8; Michael G. 
Peletz, Islamic Modern: Religious Courts and Cultural Politics in Malaysia (Princeton 
University Press: Princeton, 2002); and Mounira Charrad, States and Women’s Rights: 
The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco (University of California 
Press: Berkeley, 2002).
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than not these conditions were tied to the content of local politics, 
with fragile coalitions remaining considerably more reserved than 
postcolonial dictators and one-party dominant regimes. 
Looking back, for instance, we see that fragile coalition 
governments were often keen on extending the ‘rhetoric’ of 
Muslim personal law (for example, as a way to win political points) 
without, in any way, seeking to engage the rather more difficult 
task of ‘substantive’ religious-cum-legal reform: consider, for 
example, with respect to inheritance, specific efforts to extend the 
application of ‘existing’ shares for women—over and above, say, the 
prevailing terms of persistent ‘tribal’ customs (1948, 1950, 1951, 
and so on). 
Following the military coup led by General Ayub Khan in 
1958, however, we see something else entirely—something more 
‘substantive’. Again, the MFLO (1961) did not confine itself to 
the application of already ‘existing’ shares. Instead it completely 
redefined those shares. And of course it did so in the context of an 
almost untouchable (indeed an explicitly dictatorial) ‘modernizing’ 
postcolonial regime.25 
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1970–7) did not attempt 
to introduce any ‘substantive’ religious-cum-legal reforms, with one 
(possible) exception. This exception concerned his support for a 
special constitutional amendment (Article 260) excommunicating 
Pakistan’s beleaguered Ahmedi minority. Yet even here it is essential 
to point out that, when this constitutional amendment was 
introduced in 1974, Bhutto’s party—the Pakistan People’s Party—
did not hold more than 60 per cent of the existing seats in the 
legislature; in fact, they held only 59 per cent of those seats (a figure 
that amounted to nine times more seats than its nearest political 
competitor—the Pakistan Muslim League or Qayyum). Indeed, even 
if the promulgation of Article 260 is taken to represent a case of 
‘substantive’ religious-cum-legal reform, it would not undermine the 
basic terms of my argument—an argument regarding the importance 
25 It is worth pointing out that in some ways Ayub Khan’s promulgation 
of the MFLO was doubly untouchable owing to the existence of a Provisional 
Constitutional Order (PCO) creating vulnerable and compliant judges.
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of political context and, especially, the value of a certain immunity 
from the exigencies of cross-party ‘bargaining’.
The same pattern clearly re-emerged when General Zia-ul-Haq 
introduced his famous ‘Islamization’ campaign in 1979—a campaign 
characterized by a wide range of ‘substantive’ religious-cum-legal 
reforms concerning, for instance, marriage, divorce, taxation, rape, 
and the rules governing evidence in court. Again, each and every 
one of these reforms was promulgated by ‘executive decree’. None 
emerged, by way of ordinary ‘legislation’, following the introduction 
of a (nominally elected) Parliament—that is, a nominally elected 
‘coalition’ government— in the spring of 1985.
Again, the postcolonial history is clear. Although the terms of 
Muslim personal law were not closed off from the specific terms 
of reform (constitutionally), they were for the most part strictly 
set apart from any environment characterized by fragile ‘coalition’ 
governments. Whenever change has occurred, it has occurred in a 
context defined by (or akin to) ‘dictatorship’. 
The 1991 elections provided Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif with 
an absolute majority in the Pakistan National Assembly (51 per 
cent), and, shortly thereafter, Sharif introduced a bill known as the 
Enforcement of Shariat Bill. Given the size of Sharif ’s majority, 
however, this Bill did not involve any effort to amend the ‘substance’ 
of existing religious personal laws; instead, it simply aimed to extend 
the ‘rhetoric’ of those laws in a rather transparent bid to garner 
political support.26 In fact, the extent of its (substantive) irrelevance 
was revealed in the mechanics of its final vote: among the religious 
parties in the National Assembly none rose to support (or oppose) 
the Bill; all of them simply abstained.
Six years later, however, in 1997, Sharif returned to power with 
a much larger majority (63 per cent), leading many to believe that 
he might take up the task of ‘substantive’ religious-cum-legal reform 
with somewhat greater vigour. But in the event he did not. Instead, he 
26 In the end this Enforcement of Shari’ah Act (1991) was passed by just 40 
votes to 3. See, Christine Amjad Ali and Charles Amjad Ali, The Legislative History 
of the Shariah Act (Christian Study Centre: Rawalpindi, 1992). See also, Charles 
H. Kennedy, ‘Repugnancy to Islam: Who Decides? Islam and Legal Reform in 
Pakistan’, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, (1992), 41(4): 769–87. 
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simply opted to pursue a constitutional amendment defining a more 
limited role for the army and, in the Fall of 1999, he was removed 
from power—this time in a military coup.27
Like General Ayub Khan and General Zia-ul-Haq before him, 
General Pervez Musharraf (1999–2008) seized upon the protections 
afforded by his own military ‘dictatorship’ to revisit the path of 
‘substantive’ religious-cum-legal reform. In fact, Musharraf sought 
to amend the so-called Hudood Ordinances initially promulgated by 
General Zia-ul-Haq with an entirely new law known as the Protection 
of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act (2006).28 Separating 
‘religious’ injunctions regarding ‘adultery’ from the language of 
‘rape’ and placing any prosecution for the latter strictly within the 
(mundane) terms of Pakistan’s existing criminal code, Musharraf ’s 
reforms were strongly opposed by an amalgam of religious parties 
known as the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) (although, in its 
purely ‘advisory’ capacity, the Council of Islamic Ideology supported 
them). In fact, the ruling party within Musharraf ’s own coalition 
(a party known as the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam or 
PML-Q) actually joined the MMA in resisting this push for reform, 
forcing Musharraf to rely on several different ‘opposition’ parties to 
see his new law through. Indeed, without Musharraf, many noted 
that the prospects for reform were bleak. The support of a dictator 
was decisive.
Again and again, throughout the latter half of the twentieth 
century, the task of reform has fallen more or less exclusively to 
so-called ‘progressive’ dictators like General Pervez Musharraf in a 
tit-for-tat competition with ostensibly ‘conservative’ or ‘reactionary’ 
27 See, Babar Sattar, ‘Pakistan: Return to Praetorianism’, in Muthiah Alagappa 
(ed.), Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia 
(Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2001), pp. 385–412.
28 Notwithstanding the demands of many human rights organizations, the 
Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendement) Act, 2006 did not repeal Zia’s 
Hudood Ordinances. Instead, it retained the jurisdiction of this ordinance vis-à-
vis the ostensibly ‘religious’ crime of ‘adultery’ (while, at the same time, making 
adultery a ‘bailable offense’ and abolishing both the death penalty and flogging for 
anyone who might be convicted).
  Many religious scholars opposed these changes, arguing that every case of 
(consensual or non-consensual) ‘extra-marital sexual intercourse’ (including rape) 
should be treated in the same (‘religious’) terms.
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dictators like General Zia-ul-Haq—both sides seeking to define and 
then, in due course, redefine the legal ‘substance’ of Islam. Clearly, 
the terms of Islamic law have not been closed off from the task of 
‘substantive’ religious-cum-legal reform. But again, the conditions 
surrounding these reforms have remained quite far removed from the 
fragile coalition governments of the late 1940s, the early 1950s, the 
late 1980s, the early 1990s, and today. When change has occurred, 
it has occurred in a context defined by the benefits of bargaining 
‘immunity’. Only the ‘immunized’, it seems, are prepared to stand 
up and say, ‘Behold!’
the PolItIcs of Personal law reform In IndIa
The situation in India is, perhaps surprisingly, almost exactly the 
same. In fact, ‘equal status’ (secular) forms of constitutionalism 
notwithstanding (see John H. Mansfield, Chapter 5 in this volume), 
the only difference seems to lie in a basic tendency to replace the 
reform-oriented work of military authoritarian leaders like General 
Ayub Khan, General Zia-ul-Haq, or General Pervez Musharraf with 
the work of non-military authoritarian leaders and the leaders of one-
party dominant regimes in which the ruling party enjoys a single-party 
majority of at last 60 per cent in the lower house of the legislature 
(that is, the Lok Sabha). The key to success for those with an interest 
in ‘substantive’ patterns of personal law reform, in other words, still 
flows from an ability to construct a political environment that is, for 
all intents and purposes, ‘immune’ to the inconveniences associated 
with cross-party legislative bargaining. (In his essay, Mansfield does 
not address this effort to redefine the substance of religious personal 
laws; instead, he considers cases in which individuals convert from 
one religion and, thus, one religious personal law to another.)
From a strictly constitutional perspective the terms of Indian 
secularism are remarkably ambivalent when it comes to the problem 
of ‘substantive’ religious-cum-legal reform. It could be that the 
Constitution’s ‘equal status’ provisions amount to a recipe for equal-
status safeguarding—that is, in some sense, a constitutional commit-
ment to ensure that each religious tradition is ‘equally protected’ 
from the vagaries of State-based interference. But, of course, it could 
also be that India’s ‘equal status’ provisions amount to a recipe for 
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equivalent forms of (legislative or judicial) vulnerability; indeed, it 
may be that, together, the Indian Lok Sabha and the Indian Supreme 
Court are (constitutionally) responsible for bringing each tradition 
(including each tradition of religious personal law) into conformity 
with other constitutional norms—for example, the norm of gender 
equality (Articles 14 and 15).
Within the Indian Constitution, this impulse for equal-opportunity 
‘reform’ is particularly evident within the so-called directive prin-
ciples outlined in Articles 36–51 (including Article 44, which urges 
the State to reconcile its many different personal laws within what 
is commonly known as a ‘uniform’ civil code). Having said this, 
however, it is also clear that the special function of these directive 
principles is not at all unlike that of the directive principles we 
encountered in the case of Pakistan’s Council of Islamic Ideology: 
on the one hand, ‘directive principles’ designed to promote a 
particular trajectory of reform (and thus, a particular ‘constraint’ on 
independent legislative action); and yet, on the other hand, a set of 
‘principles’ that are themselves strictly ‘advisory’ (amounting to no 
immediately enforceable constitutional ‘constraint’ at all). 
In India, just as much as Pakistan, those with an interest in the 
reform of religious personal law, and, especially, religious personal 
laws regarding inheritance, tend to confront specific questions 
regarding the extent to which new heirs might be ‘added’ to an 
already existing (and ostensibly sacred) list. Within the Mitakshara 
School of Hindu law traditionally prevailing in most parts of India 
(except Bengal), for instance, women are not regarded as full-fledged 
‘heirs’. In fact, within the Mitakshara School of law, their relationship 
with the ancestral property of their deceased male relatives is not 
defined by any specific form of ‘ownership’ rights at all; instead, it is 
defined by what is commonly known as a ‘limited’ lifetime estate—
that is, an estate in which surviving widows, daughters, mothers, 
paternal grandmothers, and so on enjoy what is usually described 
as ‘a usufructuary right of maintenance’ until (a) their marriage or 
(b)  their death. (With respect to an ancestral home or a piece of 
ancestral land, for example, these women will be ‘maintained’ either 
directly or via certain types of rental income; they will not be entitled 
to sell the land, or exchange it, or simply give it away.) In fact, among 
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Hindus in India, the challenge for would-be reformers typically lies 
in seeking to ‘add’ women to the list of those enjoying full-fledged 
legal ‘ownership’ rights to every ‘ancestral’ estate.29
Beginning in 1940 and then continuing after the independence 
of India in August 1947, the disinheritance of women was taken 
up with considerable vigour by a special committee known as the 
Hindu Law Committee.30 The work of this committee was bitterly 
opposed by those who considered the existing terms of Hindu law to 
be utterly ‘sacred’ and, therefore, legally ‘untouchable’. (As Reba Som 
explains, the members of this committee were plagued by ‘a recurrent 
cry…that the Hindu shastras were hallowed by tradition’, and, thus, 
that ‘any attempt to tamper with them [would be] presumptuous 
29 The Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act (1929) opened up colonial 
notions of Hindu law for reform. In particular, it declared that, in cases where a 
Hindu man died without any sons (or a surviving father), the right to inherit various 
forms of property not associated with the Hindu coparcenary (that is, the traditional 
body of ‘agnatic’ Hindu heirs) would include son’s daughters, daughter’s daughters, 
sisters, and sister’s sons in preference to the man’s surviving brothers. This adjustment 
did not affect the list of existing ‘coparcenary’ heirs; it simply elevated the Madras 
School of Mitakshara Hindu Law to the status of a national norm with respect to 
every other form of (non-coparcenary) property. In 1937, the British colonial State 
introduced a new law known as the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act (The 
Deshmukh Act), which aimed to provide Hindu widows with usufructuary access to 
a portion of the joint family estate once held by their deceased husbands—a portion 
equal to that inherited by each of her agnatic coparcenary sons. (Legally speaking, 
however, these women were not ‘added’ to the list of sacred heirs as full-fledged 
‘owners’. They were simply ‘maintained’ by a tiny portion of the ‘share’ once held by 
their husbands. And, alas, daughters were ignored altogether.)
30 The authors of the first Hindu Law Committee report (1941) noted that 
‘Hindu law had kept in step with the requirements of society because of the efforts 
of the smrtikaras’, that is, the authors of the smrtis, as well as various ‘commentators’. 
But, insofar as ‘such traditional authorities no longer existed’, they noted that 
‘legislatures and the courts…[had a] responsibility [for] reinterpreting Hindu law 
to make it conform with the changed times’. See, Archana Parashar, Women and 
Family Law Reform in India: Uniform Civil Code and Gender Equality (Sage: New 
Delhi, 1992), p. 90. Still, Parashar explains that the members of this first Hindu 
Law Committee ‘did not rely on the rules of interpretation…employed by [ancient] 
commentators. … Instead they justified their proposals with a selective reliance on 
textual authority and…a recognition of changed conditions’, always claiming to 
reflect ‘the true intention of the smrtis’ (p. 92); see also, pp. 98–101.
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and undesirable’.)31 But in due course this committee succeeded 
in putting forward a host of rather dramatic (and ‘substantive’) 
religious-cum-legal reforms. 
Even after these reforms were tabled in 1948, they languished in 
the capital for more than eight years.32 In fact, even after one of their 
chief architects, Constituent Assembly Chairman B.R. Ambedkar, 
unveiled India’s new Constitution in 1950—a Constitution that left 
considerable room for such reforms—it was not until Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru emerged from India’s first general elections in 1952 
with a single-party majority amounting to 74 per cent of the existing 
Lok Sabha seats that the climate began to shift.33
In her account of this rather dramatic legal-cum-political 
development, Archana Parashar explains that within India, ‘it was 
widely believed that, because…Congress [had] won the first general 
elections [with such a huge majority] it had acquired the mandate 
of the population for Hindu law reform’.34 In fact, she notes, it 
was almost as if Nehru himself had secured the mantle of divine 
inspiration, announcing in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956—one of 
the four new Acts that came together to form India’s ‘reformed’ Hindu 
Code—that, thenceforth, both Hindu sons and Hindu daughters 
31 Reba Som, ‘Jawaharlal Nehru and the Hindu Code: A Victory of Symbol over 
Substance?’, Modern Asian Studies, (1994), 28(1): 174. 
32 According to Archana Parashar, the ‘reform of Hindu law was not taken up in 
response to public demand’. On the contrary, ‘the State assumed…responsibility for 
reform on its own initiative’ (p. 81). In fact, ‘the authors of the second Hindu Law 
Committee [report] overtly assumed that the legislature had the right to decide what 
changes were needed…and when’ (p. 85).
33 Quoting Lok Sabha member R.K. Chahdhuri, Reba Som argues, ‘without 
[Nehru], the [Hindu Succession Act]…would not have been passed at all’ (p. 193). 
34 Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India, p. 88. See also, Som, 
‘Jawaharlal Nehru and the Hindu Code’, p. 185. As Parashar points out, ‘it is difficult 
to accept that at the time of first introducing the bills [in 1948] the government 
was not sure of its capacity to carry through some of the reform measures but 
succeeded in actually enacting them into law [only] after these proposals had been 
altered and made [even] more radical by the Joint Committee or by the Rajya 
Sabha’ (for example, by including those governed by Mitakshara law within the 
ambit of the new legislation, despite earlier efforts to exclude this group) (p. 111). 
Clearly, the confidence needed to enact these reforms was delivered by the general 
election and, more specifically, Parashar explains, by the overwhelming size of the 
Congress Party majority.
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would be entitled to an equal portion of the share (‘ownership’) once 
held by their deceased Hindu father.35 Indeed, Nehru went even 
further, declaring that, for the first time ever, Hindu ‘owners’ would 
be entitled to create a will—a will that could of course be used to 
shift this new share for ‘daughters’ in favour of specific ‘brothers’.36 
Of course, the reach of this rather sweeping reform initiative was 
limited, particularly with respect to the all-important question of 
agricultural land, by the fact that the Indian Constitution continued 
to describe matters pertaining to land as a ‘provincial’ or ‘state-level’ 
subject. (See, for example, the so-called ‘Concurrent List’ outlined in 
the Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution.) But, even then, 
several states simply opted to repeat the experience first initiated in 
Delhi, using their own rather enormous state-level majorities to push 
Nehru’s agenda forward.
In 1975, for instance, the Congress-led ‘Ruling Front Alliance’ in 
Kerala added the political immunities associated with Indira Gandhi’s 
Emergency to its own overwhelming legislative majority—a majority 
amounting to 63 per cent of the seats in the Kerala State Assembly—to 
eradicate the persistence of any agnatic (all-male) ‘Hindu coparcenary 
estates’.37 Ten years later, the newly formed Telugu Desam Party in 
Andhra Pradesh used its powerful 69 per cent majority in the Andhra 
State Assembly to ensure that women throughout Andhra Pradesh 
35 Although the Act abolished the concept of a ‘limited’ lifetime estate, seeking to 
provide ‘equal’ rights for both sons and daughters in the property of their deceased 
father, the Act did not seek to eliminate the concept of an agnatic (all-male) 
‘coparcenary’. To illustrate: A father with three sons and a daughter would leave 
1/4th to each son, as members of the agnatic coparcenary, with the final 1/4th—the 
father’s own share—being divided into four ‘equal’ parts, including one part for 
each son and one part for the remaining daughter; each son = 1/4 + 1/16 = 15/16; 
daughter = 1/16.
36 ‘While the predominant effort was to justify [these] changes as being in 
consonance with the religious texts,’ Parashar notes, ‘there was [really] no suggestion 
that the dharmasastras could not be modified by the legislature’ (emphasis added) (p. 96). 
See also, A. Gledhill, ‘Constitutional and Legislative Development in the Indian 
Republic’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, (1957), 20(1/3): 276; 
and Lucy Carroll, ‘Daughter’s Right of Inheritance in India: A Perspective on the 
Problem of Dowry’, Modern Asian Studies, (1991), 25(4): 791–809.
37 Because the tenure of Kerala’s Ruling Front Alliance was extended three times 
during the Emergency, it remained in place when the Kerala Joint Hindu Family 
System (Abolition) Act, 1975 came into force on 1 December 1976.
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would be treated as ‘full’ members of every Hindu ‘coparcenary’.38 
Indeed, what set these moments of ‘substantive’ reform apart was not 
the political ‘platform’ of the ruling party (‘national’, ‘regional’, etc); 
what set them apart was the strength of the ruling party’s majority. 
In 1989, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Tamil Nadu 
captured 64 per cent of the seats in the Tamil Nadu State Assembly 
(following a year of President’s Rule). And immediately thereafter, 
they repeated the work of their colleagues in Andhra Pradesh. Five 
years later, in 1994, similar reforms were undertaken under similar 
political circumstances in Karnataka, where the Congress Party held 
79 per cent of the existing state-level seats, as well as in Maharashtra.39 
(It is, however, important to concede that, strictly speaking, the state-
level majority in Maharashtra following the State Assembly elections 
of March 1990 amounted to slightly less than 50 per cent.40 Still, 
few would disagree that the ruling Congress Party recovered quite 
dramatically after India’s general elections in June 1991, securing 
77 per cent of Maharashtra’s 48 Lok Sabha seats; in fact, substantial 
victories in subsequent local panchayat and municipal corporation 
elections ensured that Maharashtra’s state-level Congress Party was 
in a much stronger position when Maharashtra finally introduced its 
own Hindu Succession Amendment during the summer of 1994.) 
Indeed, even when it came to the politically sensitive subject of 
Muslim personal law, India’s efforts to pursue the path of ‘substantive’ 
religious-cum-legal reform followed more or less exactly the same 
pattern. 
In 1973, for instance, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi simply 
ignored a pattern of elite ulema-based resistance when, armed 
with a single-party Lok Sabha majority of 66 per cent, she opted 
to revise the existing Criminal Procedure Code (Section 125) in 
38 In June 1985, the Telugu Desam Party used its overwhelming majority to 
abolish Andhra’s Congress-dominated upper house (a.k.a. the Legislative Council), 
and, two months later, it went on to pass a new Hindu Succession (Andhra Pradesh 
Amendment) Act.
39 See, the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989, the 
Hindu Succession (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1994, and the Hindu Succession 
(Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 1994.
40 After the March 1990 Maharashtra State Assembly elections, the Congress 
Party held a total of 141 out of 288 seats (49 per cent). 
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an effort to ensure that all female divorcees throughout India—
Muslim and non-Muslim alike—would be governed by the same 
law of maintenance (notwithstanding the presence of an entirely 
separate and, some argued, a constitutionally ‘protected’ Muslim 
personal law of divorce).41 Indeed, when this issue resurfaced more 
than ten years later following the infamous Shah Bano decision in 
1985, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi simply built on his own single-
party majority—an unprecedented 76 per cent—to reframe the 
substance of Muslim personal law itself: ‘Behold!’, noted the Indian 
Supreme Court in its review of the entirely new Muslim Women’s 
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act (1986) that emerged from this 
effort, Muslim divorcees would be entitled to receive a post-divorce 
allowance even beyond the traditional three-month period known as 
iddat.42 And ‘Lo!’, this maintenance could be claimed from several 
41 Briefly stated, Indira Gandhi amended Section 125 of the revised Criminal 
Procedure Code to note that, for the purposes of claiming maintenance, the 
meaning of the word ‘wife’ should be taken to include both married and divorced 
wives. This did not introduce a change in terms of Muslim personal law per se, 
because, of course, the Criminal Procedure Code was a criminal law targeting all 
Indians without any special concern for their particular religious affiliations. But, 
even so, some Muslims objected on the basis that Muslim personal law contained 
its own (separate) provisions for the maintenance of divorced wives. Whereas Indira 
Gandhi sought to provide women (including divorced women) with a lifetime 
maintenance guarantee, for instance, some Muslims argued that in divorces initiated 
by husbands (known as ‘triple talak’), Muslim men were obligated to maintain 
their divorced wives for a period of roughly three months, three menstrual, or three 
lunar cycles—a period known as iddat—and no more. And, in divorces initiated by 
wives (khula), they noted that husbands were not obligated to pay any maintenance 
at all; instead, divorced wives were generally expected to return the money they 
(should have) received at the time of their marriage—a sum described as mehr. In 
short, a law requiring husbands to maintain their divorced wives in perpetuity—and 
that too with an amount specified by a criminal judge—was regarded as anathema 
to traditional interpretations of Muslim personal law. The Constitution itself, 
many argued, allowed for a certain freedom of religious expression (including the 
preservation of religious personal laws subject to various notions of ‘public order’ 
and ‘morality’), and, with this in mind, many insisted that Section 125 of the newly 
amended CrPC (1973) should not apply to Muslims. Still, Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi simply built on the strength of her parliamentary majority, applying Section 
125 to all citizens as a purely ‘humanitarian’ measure.
42 In the case of Mohammad Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano, (1985), 2 SCC 556, 
the Supreme Court noted that, as per Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code 
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different sources, including state-level waqf boards. And finally, 
‘Rejoice!’ This provision was not limited to cases of talaq initiated by 
husbands. It applied to all divorces including so-called khula divorces 
initiated by Muslim wives.43
Of course, in the context of these reforms, Parashar noted that 
the government ‘could have utilized…considerable scholarly opinion 
[noting] that it is possible and desirable to modify some aspects of…
Islamic law without undermining [its] sacred nature’ (emphasis 
added).44 But, following in the footsteps of General Ayub Khan 
and his MFLO in Pakistan, the Supreme Court argued that Rajiv 
Gandhi did not bother. On the contrary, they noted that he simply 
responded to an appeal from local Muslims to clarify, in the context 
of fresh legislation, the ‘substance’ of Muslim personal law.45 
(1973), destitute Muslim divorcees were entitled to receive a maintenance allowance 
from their husbands even beyond the period known as iddat. In fact, the Court 
reiterated the fact that Section 125 had been amended as a ‘humanitarian’ measure 
set apart from the specific terms of Muslim personal law (although, having done so, 
the Court went on to explain that, even if Section 125 had attempted to address 
the terms of Muslim personal law, it would have remained fully in keeping with 
the spirit of shari’ah). Needless to say, this effort to redefine the spirit of shari’ah 
prompted an intense political backlash, particularly on the part of the ulema, and 
especially, the Muslim Personal Law Board based in Delhi. In fact, the strength of 
this backlash led Muslim League General Secretary G.M. Banatwala to sponsor the 
bill that ultimately led to the promulgation of the Muslim Women’s (Protection of 
Rights on Divorce) Act (1986).
43 The Muslim Women’s (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act intended to 
‘protect’ the rights of divorced Muslim women within the terms of Muslim personal 
law. In particular, it sought to embrace a modified interpretation of Hanafi Sunni 
jurisprudence and having done so, it sought to apply this interpretation to all Muslims 
(both Sunni and Shi’a) across India. In fact, even within this modified interpretation 
the Act explained that destitute Muslim divorcees would be entitled to file a claim for 
maintenance, not only from their ex-husbands, but also (for the first time) from other 
relatives, including their parents and their brothers, as well as state-level waqf boards.
44 Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India, p. 186. 
45 The Muslim Women’s (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, effectively 
reconstructed the substance of Muslim personal law to provide, in Section 3(1)(a), 
protections for destitute women similar to those granted by the Supreme Court in 
its Shah Bano decision. In fact, the nature of these protections was clarified in the 
case of Daniel Latifi v. Union of India (2001) 7 SCC 740, which, in upholding the 
Muslim Women’s Act, 1986, explained that divorced Muslim women still enjoyed 
access to a ‘reasonable and fair’ level of maintenance even after the post-divorce 
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Throughout postcolonial India, the terms of ‘substantive’ 
religious-cum-legal reform have rarely occurred without the 
protections afforded by a climate of overwhelming political power. 
The Hindu Marriage (Amendment) Act, 1964, was introduced when 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress Party controlled 
73 per cent of the Lok Sabha seats; the Marriage Laws (Amendment) 
Act, 1976, was promulgated during Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s 
Emergency; the Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987, was 
passed when Rajiv Gandhi enjoyed a single-party majority of 76 per 
cent; and so on46 (see Table 7.1). In fact, the only exception to this 
basic rule so far involves the recent promulgation of a new Hindu 
Succession (Amendment) Act by the Congress-led United Progressive 
Alliance (UPA) coalition that emerged in 2004—a coalition in which 
the Congress Party controlled the smallest number of Lok Sabha seats 
(just 27 per cent) ever held by a postcolonial ruling party. 
Building on the combined efforts of several different civil society 
organizations, as well as—and, perhaps, especially—prior state-level 
reforms, this new Act (2005) introduced fully equal ‘ownership’ 
rights for Hindu sons and daughters (while, at the same time, 
allowing both to serve as the ‘manager’ of joint Hindu property).47 
And remarkably, it did so within the context of an extremely fragile 
coalition government. In fact, for the first time ever, the Indian 
government seemed to address the task of ‘substantive’ religious-
cum-legal reform as a matter of routine civil society engagement and 
(above all) fragile coalition politics.
period known as iddat. In other words—owing to the rather innovative approach 
to maintenance enshrined in the Muslim Women’s Act, 1986—women still enjoyed 
some access to a lifetime maintenance guarantee as outlined in Section 125 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code (1973).
46 Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India, p. 272. The Marriage Laws 
(Amendment) Act, 1976, which provided additional grounds for the dissolution of 
marriage, such as divorce by ‘mutual consent’ and, somewhat later, Clause 21(a) in the 
Special Marriage (Amendment) Act, 1976 (according to which two Hindus married 
under this Act were made subject to the ‘Hindu’ Succession Act, 1956 rather than the 
‘Indian’ Succession Act, 1925) were by far the most prominent examples. Indeed, the 
timing of these reforms in the context of Indira Gandhi’s Emergency is telling. 
47 Some activists, such as Bina Agarwal, supported this change, even as they 
argued that the co-parcenary should have been abolished altogether. See, Bina 
Agarwal, ‘Landmark Step to Gender Equality’, The Hindu, 25 September 2005.
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Table 7.1 Leading Party: Share of Lok Sabha Seats  
(Government/Prime Minister)
Year
Share of Lok 
Sabha Seats (%)
Leading 
Party Government Prime Minister
1952* 74.4 Congress Congress Jawaharlal Nehru
1957* 75.1 Congress Congress Jawaharlal Nehru
1957* 75.1 Congress Congress Jawaharlal Nehru
1962* 73.1 Congress Congress Jawaharlal Nehru,  
Lal Bahadur Shastri
1967 54.4 Congress Congress Indira Gandhi
1971* 66.0 Congress Congress Indira Gandhi
Emergency: 1975–7
1977 54.1 Janata Party Janata Party Morarji Desai, 
Charan Singh
1980* 66.7 Congress Congress Indira Gandhi
Assassination of Indira Gandhi: October 1984
1984* 76.4 Congress Congress Rajiv Gandhi




V.P. Singh, Chandra 
Shekhar
Assassination of Rajiv Gandhi: March 1991
1991 44.8 Congress Congress P.V. Narasimha Rao
1996 29.5 BJP Congress-
supported 
United Front
H.D. Deve Gowda, 
I.K. Gujral
*Government with single-party majority above 60 per cent promulgates 
substantive religious personal law reform.
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conclusIon
The challenge, of course, lies in explaining why most coalition 
governments have felt themselves to be so much more thoroughly 
constrained than this initial UPA government in India (2004–9). 
Indeed, why is it that for so long, elected representatives have been 
so very subdued when faced with the prospect of reforming the 
religious-cum-legal landscape that surrounds them? Is the Hindu 
Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, an anomaly? Or perhaps, as 
many reformers hope, an arbiter of future trends?
Clearly, specific ‘constitutional’ barriers are not sufficient to 
explain the inhibitions that I have highlighted in the context of 
this essay. On the contrary, neither India nor Pakistan harbours any 
relevant constitutional constraints. Neither harbours any special 
class of religious-cum-legal elites with any preemptive veto. And 
of course, as John H. Mansfield also stresses in his contribution 
to this volume, neither has attempted to erect a towering ‘wall of 
separation’ between religion, on the one hand, and the work of 
the legislature, on the other. In fact, from a purely ‘constitutional’ 
perspective, the most important question is really one regarding 




















**Government with single-party majority below 60 per cent promulgates 
substantive religious personal law reform.
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what can only be described as an apparent inhibition, on the part of 
several ruling coalitions, to engage the legally permissive environment 
that surrounds them. Is political negotiation or bargaining in a non-
authoritarian multi-party coalition somehow more difficult when it 
comes to negotiations involving ‘religion’? And if so, why? Why are 
‘religious’ laws, democratically, so much more difficult to reform? 
Constitutionally, existing attachments to religious personal law 
do not constrain the reach of democratic legislatures. In fact, in 
this sense, even ‘special status’ constitutions that privilege certain 
religious traditions cannot be said to depart (automatically) from the 
specific terms of democracy. And of course, drawing special attention 
to the power of history—for example, colonial history—it is simply 
impossible to suggest that the legacy of the colonial State might be 
sufficient to explain specific patterns of ‘reformist’ variation over 
time—not only between countries (Pakistan v. India) but also within 
them (Pakistan 1948 v. 1961; India 1948 v. 1956; and so on). On the 
contrary, like so many factors that stretch across these variations, the 
power of ‘colonialism’ is a ‘constant’. 
Even if prevailing constitutional and colonial arrangements fail 
to explain these patterns of variation, however, specific political 
arrangements do not: India under Prime Ministers Jawaharlal Nehru 
and Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistan under Generals Ayub Khan and 
Zia-ul-Haq pursued major ‘substantive’ reforms; Prime Ministers 
Benazir Bhutto and Narasimha Rao did not. If, however, fragile 
coalition governments like those of Benazir Bhutto and Narasimha 
Rao represent an increasingly common feature of the existing 
political landscape in South Asia—and I would argue they do—
the question arises: what are the implications of this coalition-based 
political landscape for the underlying possibility of (ongoing) religious-
cum-legal reform? Indeed, how does a history of reform set apart from 
the terms of cross-party bargaining interact with, or challenge, the 
outlook for reform in South Asia’s postcolonial ‘democracies’? Is the 
Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 an anomaly or an arbiter 
of future trends?
When a well-known mullah by the name of Ehtisham-ul-Haq 
Thanvi rejected Ayub Khan’s push to provide a legal defence for 
the inheritance rights of orphaned grandchildren, noting that, ‘as 
a matter of principle, reference to public opinion on purely shariat 
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questions amounts to trifling with…[the] shariat and ridiculing the 
religion’,48 he was not articulating the views of a lonely cleric. On 
the contrary, he was articulating an extremely widespread sense of 
political apprehension regarding the religious propriety of proactive 
religious-cum-legal reforms. He was, in fact, pushing back against the 
‘presumptuous’ zeal of postcolonial reformers, articulating a popular 
attachment to the separation of religion, religious personal law, and 
modern ‘democratic’ politics. 
When a Hindu Mahasabha member of India’s Legislative Assembly 
asked, in 1955, ‘what right…Prime Minister [Jawaharlal Nehru had] 
to initiate revolutionary bills which would shake the roots of Indian 
civilization shaped by a personal law which [had] stood the test of 
centuries’, he was not articulating the views of a renegade Hindu 
‘extremist’.49 He was, in fact, articulating a rather common pattern of 
formal (legal) hesitation—one that, at the time, reflected the views of 
his Congress Party colleague, the President of India, Rajendra Prasad.50 
As David S. Powers noted, in 1998, in a special issue of Islamic 
Law and Society devoted to the Islamic law of inheritance, in 1998, 
it is essential to understand ‘how Muslims have interpreted and, on 
occasion, reshaped and redefined the materials contained within the 
corpus of Islamic law’. In fact, he went out of his way to stress the 
extent to which Islamic law, ‘like other legal systems’, is ‘a product of 
 history’.51 But the important question does not concern the power 
of history as such; rather, the most important question concerns the 
extent to which historically familiar processes of reinterpretation, 
redefinition, and reform have become so powerfully unfamiliar 
politically.52 What are the implications of this political unfamiliarity 
for those with an interest in the relationship—indeed the special legal 
relationship—between ‘religion’ and ‘democracy’ today? Is it possible 
48 Report of the Commission on Marriage and Family Laws (Law Division, 
Government of Pakistan: Islamabad, 1963), p. 92.
49 Som, ‘Jawaharlal Nehru and the Hindu Code’, p. 174. 
50 Ibid., p. 182.
51 See, David Powers, ‘The Islamic Inheritance System’, Islamic Law and Society, 
(1998), 5(3): 290.
52 Richly historicized processes of religious re-interpretation are often paired with 
a deep reluctance to define these processes as religiously (or politically) ‘legitimate’. 
Indeed, those who seek to promote such processes are often seen as heretics.
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to imagine a situation in which the processes that Powers described 
as historically and religiously ‘normal’ are, in fact, also politically 
‘normal’ and, hence, politically accessible to those with an interest 
in reiterative patterns of religious debate, political negotiation, and, 
ultimately, ‘democratic’ religious-cum-legal reform?
Scholars have not yet had a chance to examine the bargaining 
processes that preceded the promulgation of India’s Hindu Succession 
(Amendment) Act, 2005.53 But when they do, several questions 
will merit their attention. These questions will concern the ways in 
which those involved in this process of reform managed to articulate 
a coherent ‘religious’ justification for their efforts. Did they succeed 
in bringing the terms of ‘politics’ and ‘religion’ together? And if they 
did, how exactly did they manage it? Did their efforts unfold within 
a ‘religious’ language of ‘religious-cum-political reform’? And if so, 
what did that language sound like? 
These are the questions that my project has raised so far: What 
does this language sound like? Is such a language possible? And if so, 
what are its preconditions?
53 For a legal assessment of this law, see the work of Indian Law Commission 
Chairman, Justice A.R. Lakshmanan, ‘Proposal to amend the Hindu Succession 
Act, 1956, as amended by Act 39 of 2005’ (5 February 2008). See also, Agarwal, 
‘Landmark Step to Gender Equality’. 
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